MIDWAY, June 4th, 1942

[Jim Craik]

I thought we should start a new thread, as we have been squatting on others.

Jeff, tell me more about the Kaga, not sending aircraft on the first Midway strike. I have never heard that, but who knows. Additionally, if Kaga, held back a spotted, anti-shipping strike, why were they not launched well before McCluskey or even Waldren arrived?

Other things I would love to discuss:

Stanthorp Ring, innocent, faked report?

The other VT-8 survivors, hint: TBF.

Fuchida, truth or consequences?

Tone #4, what the f***?

Who hit the Akagi and when?

USS Hornet, what the f***?

Miles Browning, major prick? Did Spruance ignore him?

Spruance, he's the man?

Mark Mitscher, doctored report?

 

[Jim Craik]

The other VT-8 survivors:

I recently read a great book, called "A Dawn Like Thunder". Its the story of Torpedo 8. Starting with training and later joining the Hornet. Before the Hornet left for the Pacific, five or six crews, were detached to pick up the new TBF Avenger, from Grumman.

Everyone was hoping that VT-8 would completely switch to the TBF's in San Diego, before leaving for Pearl.

The fact that the Hornet was chosen for the Doolittle Raid, killed those plans. The Hornet stopped at Alameda just long enough to pick up Doolitle's bunch, then straight to Pearl, via Tokyo.

The TBF contingent finally made it to Pearl just as the Enterprise and Hornet were leaving for Midway. There was just not enough time to qualify and join them. Big dissapointment for the TBF guys.

Then the next day, four or five of them were orderd to fly to Midway and operate from the Island.

Early on the morning of the 4th, they along with several Midway groups (B-17, Vindicators and B-26s...) were sent out in unorganized groups to hit the Japanese carriers.

As we Know, things did not go well, but one, well shot up TBF did get back to Midway, unfortunally the ball gunner was killed.

These two brave survivors then had to endure hearing all the stories about Lt Gay being the "ONLY" survivor from Torpedo 8! No one believed their story, a everone knew the Gay was only one to come back.

They called themselves the "OTHER" only survivors.

 

[Jim Craik]

Here are some Torpedo 8 photos from June 4th 1942, The first one shows the takeoff of one of the doomed TBDs, the second one is the VT-8 TBF on Midway after its attack.

 

[Jim Craik]

This is a photo, I have not seen before, it shows the ILN Tone, pulling up its anchor, as they leave for Midway. One of those aircraft on the rear deck is the famous/infamous Tone #4.

 

[Jim Craik]

I found this very interesting sight.

For those who are not familiar with Midway. On June 4th, 1942, The Japanese came to Midway with four, large fleet carriers. The US hoped to ambush them with our three available carriers: the Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet. On that very important day, the USS Hornet was a bust. Planes from the Hornet made absolutly no hits, and outside of their Torpedo squadren 8, who disregarded a direct order and were wiped out, the rest of the Hornets strike flew to "nowhere", loosing half the planes, never seeing the enemy. This is a discussion of the Hornet on that day. It also brings into question, if Stanthorp Ring and Captain Mitcher were truthful in their after action report.

THE FLIGHT TO NOWHEREfficeffice" /><?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com

Weisheit book plus his revealing discovery of the PBY evidence (p. 133 in NRTW), there is the equally unambiguous testimony of Chief Richard Woodson (p. 136), who definitely saw Waldron and VT-8 break away to the left from the HAG, not to the right. That only could have happened on course 265 (compare pages 132 and 135). The clincher is the fact that Woodson’s eyewitness account is completely independent of Weisheit and his book—Woodson had never heard of either before I raised the subject with him.<o></o>
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Rationalizing the Westbound Course<o></o>

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Declaring the westbound course a historical fact immediately presents a few problems. In the first place, why would the commander of the Hornet air group (CHAG), CDR Stanhope Ring, go that way? A cursory examination of the chart on p. 135 easily shows that he not only wouldn’t have encountered any enemy carriersin that direction, but that his planes would actually pass well behind the point where Kido Butai was first spotted, hours before he could have gotten there. Based on that alone, course 265 makes absolutely no sense whatsoever.<o></o>
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Further, if a believable rationale for such a course could somehow be postulated, you are next tasked with justifying it since any such rationale turned out to be wrong. And finally, if you can somehow explain why course 265 was the HAG’s assigned course, you need to figure out why John Waldron of VT-8 didn’t buy into it.<o></o>
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But as the discussion continued unabated on the Roundtable, a believable reason for the westbound course began to emerge. The catalyst may have been the following editorial inquiry that I wrote for the 3 August 2007 Roundtable Forum, in response to a message on the subject by one of our members:<o></o>
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This topic is perhaps the Roundtable’s most enduring, one that seems to generate solid interest at least a couple times each year. Tom Fritz reminded us of it in his message: “Mitscher and Ring sent the Hornet air group far to the north of the courses taken by Enterprise and Yorktown planes.” It even comprises one full chapter and part of another one in No Right to Win.<o></o>
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For what it’s worth, then, I have to ask this question: if we accept that the HAG departed Task Force 16 on a course of 265 degrees true (which, of course, is not proven beyond all doubt, but that’s another matter), the obvious question arises: why did Ring go that way? In his message, Tom says it was to seek the carriers that Ady didn’t see, and which were presumed to be trailing the leaders by some distance. John Lundstrom offers the same theory in Black Shoe Carrier Admiral (p. 248).<o></o>
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But I’ve always had a problem with that idea. I don’t personally recall any intelligence that suggested Nagumo’s carriers would advance on Midway in widely separated task groups. They didn’t do anything like that at Pearl Harbor and I don’t think they did it in the Indian Ocean raids, so why consider it at Midway? Perhaps one of our veterans or historians can enlighten us on that matter.<o></o>
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Then there’s the fact that course 265 intersected Kido Butai’s track behind the spot where Howard Ady first sighted them at 0552. With a launch time over two hours after that, even Ring had to know that flying course 265 would not intersect the enemy’s track until Nagumo had proceeded toward Midway for nearly another 100 miles. For me, it’s too much of a stretch to believe that Ring thought part of the Japanese carrier force would be trailing the other part by a hundred miles.<o></o>
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Tom’s basic point is valid: having seen only two enemy carriers and knowing there was at least double that number out there, it was reasonable for the PBYs to continue searching rather than dogging what appeared to be only two of them. But with regard to course 265 true for the HAG, no sensible rationale for that heading has yet appeared (in my opinion). Until it does, whether that’s the course the HAG actually flew and whether it was done deliberately will remain one of the BOM’s prime mysteries.<o></o>
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The beginning of a possible solution to the mystery came with the following response, from Roundtable member Robert Morgan:<o></o>
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As for why Commander Ring allegedly flew 265 degrees true to look for carriers behind those sighted on the morning of the fourth, the Japanese did operate two separate carrier groups at Coral Sea. Shoho was caught out in front of Shokaku and Zuikaku on that occasion, while the two larger carriers ran loose. Perhaps that was what the U.S. planners and/or Commander Ring were anticipating? Perhaps the Coral Sea experience with Shoho may have been weighing on the minds of the commanders and planners at Midway.<o></o>
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If Commander Ring did search behind the Kido Butai by flying 265 true, then that may have been his intent.<o></o>
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CINCPAC Makes an Assumption<o></o>

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By this point, then, the Roundtable was focusing on an assumption by CINCPAC that Kido Butai’s carriers approaching Midway were to be formed in widely separated groups, and that the two CVs initially seen by Howard Ady were just the leading group; a second one would be following some distance behind. But where did such a notion originate? I didn’t believe it was the Coral Sea experience, as I said in the following response to Mr. Morgan’s message:<o></o>
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Bob Morgan offered the only answer (above) to my question as to why anyone would think that the Japanese carrier striking force (Kido Butai) would separate its Midway-bound CV divisions by a very large distance. Historians have generally concluded that the HAG (Hornet air group) flew a very strange westbound course (265 degrees true) from the ship, and perhaps the best reason offered for doing so was to find Japanese carriers that were presumed to be following the two initially spotted by Howard Ady. However, for course 265 degrees true to make any sense, the calculated separation between the supposed separate carrier groups would need to be nearly a hundred miles.<o></o>
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I had asked what evidence there was that Kido Butai would fragment its carrier divisions, instead of operating them as one coherent strike force like they did at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and in the Ceylon raids in April 1942. Bob suggests that American experience in the Coral Sea, with Shoho being far removed from Shokaku and Zuikaku (Carrier Division 5 of Kido Butai) could have given reason to expect a similar separation at Midway.<o></o>
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But in my opinion, that seems unlikely. Shoho was a light carrier, mounting only about 30 planes, and it was not a part of Kido Butai. Instead, it was attached to Cruiser Division 6, the covering force for the Port Moresby invasion. It’s true that LCDR Dixon, of Lexington’s SBD force, had radioed “scratch one flat-top” after helping send Shoho to the bottom, and “one flat-top” may have been interpreted by many as one of Kido Butai’s fleet carriers. However, that notion should have disappeared when the returning American pilots reported sinking a light carrier.<o></o>
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During the past week I engaged in some lengthy e-mail exchanges with John Lundstrom and Jon Parshall on this subject, and I’ll have excerpts from those messages in the next issue. For now, though, it seems fair to conclude that the basis for the USN assuming Kido Butai would advance on Midway in separate groups arose from little more than (a) knowledge that they formed their carriers into discrete divisions, which were presumed to operate independently, and (b) an assumption that the enemy’s carrier doctrine was no different than ours; something like “we operate our carriers independently, so everyone else must do the same.”<o></o>
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That assumption is evident in two places in CINCPAC’s Midway Op-Plan 29-42, as elements of a listing preceded by “Operations...are visualized as follows:”<o></o>
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“...attacks by carrier aircraft...it is thought that one or more carriers may take up close-in daylight positions for this purpose.”
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“...covering of attacking carriers...by additional carrier groups.”<o></o>
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A look at Kido Butai’s disposition during the Pearl Harbor and Ceylon raids might have altered that assumption, but such detail would remain unknown until long after the BOM.<o></o>
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Indeed, it seems to have been a rather tenuous assumption on the part of CINCPAC’s staff, rather than hard evidence, that Kido Butai would approach Midway in separate task groups. There simply is nothing in the known historical record that would have led CINCPAC to such a conclusion, other than the assumed expectation that the enemy would operate his carriers the same way as everyone else—meaning, us.<o></o>
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For that reason, then, the paradigm of separate carrier groups found its way into CINCPAC’s official set of orders for the defense of Midway—Op Plan 29-42—and that provides the necessary rationale for the leadership of Task Forces 16 and 17 to plan for attacks on more than one formation of Japanese carriers.<o></o>
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Mitscher Makes Up His Mind<o></o>

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With that foundation, the rest of the puzzle seemed to fall into place. One of the reasons it was always difficult to ascribe course 265 to a decision by Stanhope Ring was his track record as an aviator and navigator. His pilots had provided an abundance of evidence that the CHAG was not trustworthy in the air (several specific incidents are cited in NRTW), and that could cause one to question the depth of his understanding of offensive naval air operations and his ability to plan and lead them. That suggests that the decision for course 265 came from another source, and that could only have been the USS Hornet commander himself, Captain Marc Mitscher.<o></o>
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A lengthy discourse on that possibility ensued between Jon Parshall, John Lundstrom, and myself, during which it gradually became evident that Mitscher must have wanted his air group to go after the assumed second group of Japanese carriers that had been suggested in the CINCPAC op-plan. He apparently thought his planes could find them by flying to the west, where they would encounter Kido Butai’s track some 75 to 100 miles or so behind the lead group spotted by Ady. If no enemy carriers were found there, Ring could bank left and lead his planes on the track of the known carriers, perhaps aiding the Enterprise air group in mopping them up.<o></o>
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That almost sounded like a rational idea except for one fatal flaw: there is no way that the group’s TBDs and F4Fs would have had enough fuel for such a flight, particularly in view of the gas-guzzling way the fighters were formed up upon launch from the Hornet. Here, neither Mitscher nor Ring were cognizant or caring enough to realize that the westbound course would spell the doom of at least half of the air group, irrespective of any contact with the enemy.<o></o>
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Then there is the problem of what the TF-16 commander, Spruance, had ordered Mitscher to do. Communication between the Enterprise and the Hornet was nearly non-existent, limited to whatever signals could be passed by visual means or infrequently by low-powered TBS radio. Consistent with existing U.S. Navy carrier doctrine, Mitscher rightly felt that the employment of his air group was his own discretion. After all, Op-Plan 29-42 provided only general guidance; not micromanaged attack assignments for specific air groups and squadrons. Those were the call of the on-scene commanders, and very little was coming to Mitscher from Spruance that would cause him to deviate from his own hunches.<o></o>
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John Lundstrom suggested another factor for which there is no hard evidence, but which certainly merits consideration. In his mind, Mitscher was the “aviator” among the senior officers present. He had been in naval aviation far longer than anyone else on the scene—indeed, both of the task force commanders were the infernal “blackshoes”—no personal aviation experience at all! He was even senior to Captain George Murray of the Enterprise, who was in actual command of the two-carrier task group, TG 16.5. That must have rankled the proud Mitscher a great deal! For those reasons, he very likely felt that he knew far more than Spruance or Fletcher about the business at hand, and was going to show them that was so by sending his planes in an unexpected direction where they would clobber an inbound enemy force that the blackshoes probably hadn’t thought of.<o></o>
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Waldron Finds His Way<o></o>

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When course 265 was explained to the squadron commanders on the Hornet’s bridge just before launch, Waldron must have seethed with fury at his commanders’ ignorance. An expert on the TBD, he could instantly see that his planes’ tanks would go dry long before they could have returned to the Hornet from such a flight; never mind whether any enemy ships were ever found. Orders were orders and this was war, so he duly headed out on course 265 with the rest of the HAG, playing along for perhaps 30 minutes. During that interlude he doubtless was computing an on-the-fly course change that would take him to Ady’s two carriers, Task Force 16’s actual target. Once he arrived at a solution, he broke radio silence to plead his case with Ring one last time. Denied a deviation from the westbound course, Waldron faced a critical dilemma. He could continue toward the west and ditch his entire squadron in the ocean, possibly without encountering any enemy forces, or he could head for a known target that he could actually attack and still have a good chance of making it back to the Hornet.<o></o>
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It was a bitter decision, defying one’s immediate superior during wartime while engaged in a combat operation. If Waldron had been wrong and Ring turned out to be right, he would have faced severe consequences if he’d survived—especially if Ring did not. But Waldron’s gut instincts were compelling, and in this case they were absolutely right. TBDs from the Enterprise did manage to find and attack the enemy and return to their ship—it was plainly the right decision. Waldron turned his squadron to the southwest, in a slight modification of the course he would have flown upon launch from the Hornet, and the rest is history.<o></o>
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The Flight of the Hornet Air Group: Closing the Book<o></o>

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In summary, then, viable answers are at last at hand for the three fundamental questions presented at the beginning of this article.<o></o>
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1. Which way did they go: southwest (course 240 degrees true) or west (course 265)? While a nagging doubt will always remain because of Commander Fisher’s compelling testimony concerning Midway’s smoke off his port wing, the multiple statements by other on-scene witnesses tilt the scales in favor of course 265. It would seem that all serious discussion of the HAG’s flight from this point forward must proceed from that premise.<o></o>
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2. If they went west, why does the Hornet’s after-action report say they went southwest? That’s not hard to figure out, though it remains rather astonishing to this day. Mitscher’s after-action report was not written until many days had passed after the battle’s close, by which time the embarrassing facts of where the Japanese carriers actually had been were well known. In his zeal to show the blackshoes that he knew more about the business at hand than they did, he had done precisely the opposite—his westbound decision had been the worst possible choice, most likely causing the loss of all of his fighters and all of his torpedo planes. On the other hand, the aircraft under the direct control of Spruance and Fletcher had dealt the enemy the crippling blow, making the BOM one of history’s most stunning naval victories. It had been a day of glory of which Mitscher should have been able to claim a major share. Instead, if the true facts were documented in the normal manner, he would plainly have been seen as something of a dunce, culpable for the needless loss of his own men as well as some of those from the other two carriers.<o></o>
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To avoid that career-killing embarrassment, it was a simple matter of documenting the Hornet’s part of the battle in a manner of Mitscher’s choosing. The damning evidence of that exists in the total absence of after-action reports from anyone else in the HAG, in spite of the fact that naval regulations required air group and squadron commanders to record and submit such reports. After-action reports from squadrons on the other carriers and from Midway Atoll exist in abundance; you can find several of them on this web site. Nothing like them survives from the Hornet, not from LCDR Rodee (VS-8), LCDR Johnson (VB-8), LCDR Mitchell (VF-8), and not from the CHAG himself. Nothing. There is only Mitscher’s time-honored official report of the USS Hornet at Midway. And of course, it asserts that the HAG had done what it was supposed to do per Spruance’s orders—fly southwest toward the known enemy carriers and attack them.<o></o>
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Mitscher’s Midway report was accepted as history, and he went on to become the “Magnificent Mitscher” of the fast carrier forces that helped defeat Japan.<o></o>
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3. And if the HAG went west, why? There were no enemy carriers in that direction. The answer was available for all to see long before the writing of NRTW, but insofar as I know, no one ever connected the dots in order to explicitly tell us. CINCPAC’s Op-Plan 29-42 rather plainly told Fletcher and Spruance to expect enemy carriers approaching Midway in separate task groups. Consequently, the two admirals had to plan their ambush accordingly. Once Ady’s contact report was received, the plan was formulated for TF-16 (both carriers, not just the Enterprise) to strike the known targets, reserving TF-17 (Yorktown) for follow-on attacks on the “second” enemy carrier group if scouts could find them, or for support to TF-16’s strike if no second group was found. That was all very sensible in hindsight, except that the limitations of American carrier doctrine and poor communications apparently left Mitscher with an inadequate awareness of such detailed strategy. Lacking solid contrary orders, he took it upon himself to assume the roll reserved for the Yorktown—striking the “second” enemy group while the Enterprise took care of the leading group. What he thought the Yorktown was supposed to be doing in that case is anyone’s guess.<o></o>
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It would seem, then, that we can now close the book on the mysterious flight of the Hornet air group on the morning of 4 June 1942. I fully expect that the subject will be revisited on the Roundtable from time to time because of its continuing interest, but I doubt that significantly differing answers will ever be found to the foregoing fundamental questions.<o></o>
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Finally, I need to admit that some of what is said here is opinion, and opinion is always a vulnerable commodity. To that I can only repeat the qualification found in NRTW concerning the Roundtable’s constant endeavor to seek out the facts of the Battle of Midway: the best we can ever do is interview the veterans who were there, examine the available evidence, and then form well-founded, reasonable conclusions.<o></o>

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[Jim Craik]

Today is the 70th anniversary of the battle of Midway.

Tonight I will raise a toast to Nimitz, Spruance, Waldron, McClusky, Best, Ring, Rochefort, the guys at Hypo and the rest of those heros.

Well done!

May you rest in peace.

 

[Jeff Young]

That does seem to answer the "why did Ring fly west" question AND exonerates Ring.

The info on the Kaga was from the Xo's interview with the Navy right after the war. I posted it in that other thread.

Interesting stuf.

 

[Jeff Young]

Here's a photo I'd not seen, from the Hornet. Check out the LO! Holy cow!

[Photo] SBD Dauntless aircraft landing aboard USS Hornet during the Battle of Midway, 4 Jun 1942; note Landing Signal Officer undernearth the landing aircraft | World War II Database

 

[Jim Craik]

Jeff,
This is another photo, from the same time, it shows a Yorktown F4F landing on the Hornet, the pilot left his guns armed, the quick stop led him to squeeze the trigger, spraying the island, killing several men. All in all the Hornet had a very bad day.