CA_SU-30 Amazing Russian Fighter

[John Fitzpatrick]

David- since you've mentioned the Nimrod several times, I did some quick research into it to see why its modification is so poorly regarded. It looks to me as though it points up a larger issue--the culture at the Mod (our DoD). The loss of the Nimrod and its fourteen member aircrew to an in-flight fire, and the following independent investigation was reported by the Guardian, as I’m sure you remember. It read in part:

Among the shortcomings identified in the MoD are "a failure to adhere to basic principles", an "airworthiness system that is not fit for purpose", a "safety case regime which is ineffective and wasteful", "an inadequate appreciation of the needs of aged aircraft"

The MoD team responsible for overseeing the Nimrod project failed to follow its own safety plan, signed off on BAE Systems' work when it was manifestly inappropriate to do so, and judged the outstanding risks on a "manifestly inadequate, flawed, and unrealistic basis". It was "sloppy and complacent" and "fundamentally failed to do its essential job of ensuring the safety of the Nimrod fleet," says the report.

In a further passage severely damaging to the government, Haddon-Cave says: In my view XV230 was lost because of a systemic breach of the military covenant brought about by significant failures on the part of all those involved. A sacred and unbreakable duty of care is owed to the men and women of the armed forces by reason of the fact that they are necessarily called upon to make substantial personal sacrifices, including the ultimate sacrifice, in the service of the nation."

Was this a one-off event, or have things really deteriorated to the point that aircrew safety is secondary to careerism?

 

[David Morton]

Indeed those accusations were found to be very true and those responsible are now being brought to book. My experience: What ever was needed to be done, got done often without much regard to crew safety. The inflight refuelling system was a good example and it was conceived, installed and in use in six weeks. Prior to that we were always told it was never available for installation in the Nimrod.
This aeroplane was our lead /first aeroplane at the Operational Conversion Unit. It was systematically screwed up over the years by wingless wonder career officers who didn't really have a clue and quality control was thrown out the window.
Here is a concise account of what happened:
Royal Air Force Nimrod XV230 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I think this is a fair account. There are still proceedings pending and Salmon Letters
are being bandied about as we speak.

 

[Keith]

Put simply, the MOD are complete wankers. I always wonder who's side they're on because it doesn't appear to be ours.

 

[David Morton]

Career officers in M.O.D. often do not know one end of an aeroplane from the other,
and worse still Career Engineering officers getting involved in rectification at first line level is a recipe for disaster. Example : I had a problem once on a piece of kit called Arar/Arax - (A French ECM system ) and asked for a replacement Arinc size box. We shut down the No 1 and 2 and it duly arrived and this Sqn Ldr asked me to vacate my seat so he could fit it. Well, It wouldn't locate and the power switch was bottom right insted of top left. I guess about 20 minutes later, he was still trying to operate the switch and then told me that one was u/s as well. You've guessed it already but he couldn't see it - he'd tried to fit it upside down. He seemed to resent the fact I sat holding my head in my hands and uttering profanities. I was on intercom my skipper told me to tell him to get the hell off the aeroplane which I duly quoted. My skipper was one rank below this plonker - a Flt. Lt - and things got a bit skewed for a couple of minutes until our Flight Engineer escorted him off the aeroplane. What he wasn't going to do to our crew .....
He got promoted and posted very quickly - probably to M.O.D.

 

[John Fitzpatrick]

Sounds a bit like the attitudes that were the norm in our Pentagon in the 70s and 80s. Fortunately we had a guy named John Boyd who built up a cadre of young officers who took a pledge to put "doing the right thing" ahead of their careers. They stood up to th likes of Casper Weinberg and Kelly Johnson, and, among other things. got the F-16 project past a myriad of generals who wanted to crush it. He's probably better known for his "OODA Loop" than for his battles with the Generals and their minions at the Pentagon. His biography: Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War is worth reading.

He may have been uncouth and rash, but his kind kept us from becoming another 1936 Armee de l'Air. At least for a while.

 

[Mike]

Another good book that discusses the Pentagon at that time and the cadre of young fire-breathing majors like Moody Sutter and such (who were 'forced' to go there for career broadening - they wanted to stay in the squadron and fly, but made the most of their desk jobs by fighting with the 'upper echelon' and convincing them of what the USAF really needed) is "Sierra Hotel", by Dick Anderegg. Dick was an IP at the Weapons School, who went on to bigger and better things. His book discusses the USAF Weapons School and path the USAF took to improve their tactics and 'fix' the lousy kill ratio we experienced in Viet Nam, aided by the 'majors' in the Pentagon. Interesting to note, perhaps is that in that mid to late 70 time frame, that one squadron produced one Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, one USAF Chief Of Staff and two Air Combat Command CO's (What used to be SAC and TAC, now combined)...officers who really knew what it was all about, something not necessarily taken for granted...like David's comment re. the MOD.